the future. But information may modify the DM's behaviour and hence its future payoffs valuation conditional on information. Consistence of the present value and of the future conditional values is central to the results in this paper (dynamic consistency).
We assume the DM's behaviour is represented by a non additive subjective expected utility (Choquet Expected Utility, Schmeidler (1989) ). In the spirit of de Finetti's (1930) subjective measure and of Yaari's (1987) Dual Theory in the case of risk, we concentrate on the special case where the utility is the identity (Chateauneuf (1991) , but here we rely on the simpler Diecidue and Wakker (2002) model) . In these models the decision criterion is the future payoffs present value, as well as their present certainty equivalent. Furthermore, the DM's behaviour is completely grasped by the subjective measure: here a Choquet capacity. As a first consistency requirement we assume the DM assumes its future behaviours conditional on information arrivals will satisfy the same axioms as the present one (model consistency). The problem is then to condition Choquet integrals and capacities in a way that is consistent with the present value.
Conditioning capacities is problematic: The pioneer's work of Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1967) who presented the first formula (besides Bayes') opened the way to many researches among which we can cite (forgetting many): Fagin and Halpern (1990) Conversely, in the axiomatic approach we follow in this paper, the consistency condition (an axiom on the DM's preferences) yields an equation that implicitly defines the conditional Choquet integral. The condition is usually called "Dynamic Consistency" (DC), e.g. in Karni and Schmeidler (1991) . Another condition was dubbed "Consequentialism" (C) by Hammond (1989) . We know that under the general formulations of the two axioms (DC) and (C), the preference representation criterion is linear (see Sarin and Wakker (1998) , Machina (1998) , Ghirardato (2002) , Lapied and Toquebeuf (2007) and the relevant literature) and the measures degenerate into additive or quasi additive ones after several iterations. In this paper, we obtain a different result: non-additive updated capacities that do not collapse to additive ones. This is because we weaken Consequentialism in the following sense: As usual, counterfactual events are given a zero measure, but payoffs that would be obtained if these events realised still interfere with the valuation because they may modify the payoffs' ranking 4 . Furthermore, this paper departs from others where, even though it is invoked, dynamic consistency cannot play its full role because the models themselves are not really dynamical. Indeed, in most models, the set of future states and the information that may arrive "later" are left without reference to any real timing. In the practice of managing an investment or a project and calculating its exante value, the timing of decision making is crucial: Decisions will be taken at some future dates in accordance with the then available information, e.g. information may induce options to be exercised. Obviously, in a cash flow payoffs are contingent on future dates as well as on uncertain events. Both contingencies have to be taken into account by the decision criterion that bears on decision sequences conditional on future information arrivals, i.e. in the DM's present valuation of the cash flow they generate.
Time is indeed relevant for dynamic decision making. It is economically measured by discount factors: whether market ones when a market for riskless bonds exists, or individual ones (preference for present over future consumption). Koopman (1972) gave seminal conditions for this valuation to be additive (time separability). Then, Gilboa (1989) extended the model to the non-additive case. Notice that Koopman and Gilboa, as well as all their followers (notably Chateauneuf and Rébillé (2004) ) exclude uncertainty considerations.
However, in general, future payoffs are also contingent on states (events) of uncertainty. Here again, axioms yielding additive properties to the representation of preferences were extended by Schmeidler (1989) among others to the non-additive case (e.g. Choquet Expected Utility).
In order to take the two contingencies into account in this paper, we consider cash flows (contingent on future states in a set Ω) as being contingent on two factors: uncertain states and future dates. Formally, we write: Ω = S×T, where S stands for the set of uncertain States and T represent the set of dates in the future Time under consideration. Preferences of the decision maker could be defined on payoffs contingent on future states in Ω, but most of the time they 4 Ranking is fundamental to Choquet integrals, e.g. Rank Dependent Expected Utility.
are better known on uncertain payoffs (real functions from S) and on date contingent payoffs (real functions from T). With linear value functions (functionals on real functions from S, T and Ω), present value is unambiguously the discounted expected payoffs 5 . However if, as we assume, the decision criteria may be a non-linear value function, it is not clear how to construct the present value of a cash flow X: Ω = S×T  R from the value of uncertain cash payoffs and the value of time contingent payoffs separately. Clarifying this point is the first step of this paper; the second steps yield dynamically consistent conditional measures on Uncertainty and on Time.
In section 2 of the paper, we specify our model: representation of preferences, information, and the Ghirardato-Fubini theorem (Ghirardato 1997 ) on product spaces. We concentrate in section 3 on the conditioning of capacities on uncertain states and in section 4 on the conditioning of capacities on dates (discount factors). In both cases, we check that consequentialism is violated and that capacities do not collapse into additive measures.
The model
We consider that a payoff is a measurable function X: Ω = S×T  R + where S = {s 1 , … , s N } represents the set of uncertain states to whom the payoffs are contingent and T = {1, … , T} the set of future dates, both with the sets of parts, 2 S and 2 T , as algebras. Obviously, a project may have negative payoffs and uncertainty and time may not be perceived as finite sets, we restrict the problem to this simple case in order to concentrate on the principles of dynamic valuation, i.e. consistency of preferences with information arrivals.
Representation of preferences
Given we consider finite spaces, we can refer to a simple representation of preferences model, namely the generalisation (for finite sets) of de Finetti's (1930) 
A Dutch Book exhibits an incoherence between preferences and monotony. Now we can state the three basic axioms that yield the DM's preference representation.
Axiom1: Preferences define a complete pre-order on the set of measurable functions. The representation theorem yields the three value functions that we need in order to represent preferences over the future: Ω. With X: Ω = S×T  R + , the constant equivalent of X defined by the theorem is:
X dΨ whereΨ is a capacity, and we shall note: ! "
X dP if P is additive.
V(X)
is a present certainty equivalent of X.
Obviously, Ψ defines two marginal capacities: ν (or µ if it is additive) on R S and ρ (or π if it is additive) on R T . From the previous representation theorem, we know that these measures represent the decision maker's preferences over R S and R T that satisfy the same axioms as its preferences on R Ω . The representations yield two constant equivalents.
The certainty equivalent of uncertain payoff (E for expected) is:
The present equivalent of date contingent payoffs (D(.) for discounted) is:
In most economic models these two representations are assumed to be known and the problem is to define a representation of preferences over R S×T that is consistent with the previous ones.
Two obvious candidates are:
and:
In the special case where de Finetti's coherence axiom (axiom 3') is satisfied, the cash flows' valuation representing the DM's preferences is unambiguously the (subjective) present certainty equivalent. Indeed, in this case we have:
The equalities are obtained because Fubini's theorem applies to Lebesgue integrals with respect to additive measures.
However, it is not the case that the two candidates yield the same result if the measures are not additive because Fubini's theorem doesn't apply. This why, in section 2.3, we shall invoke the Ghirardato-Fubini theorem that will allow us to construct V as whether DE or ED and investigate separately the effect of information arrivals on E and on D.
Integrating informational values in the linear valuation of a cash flow is straightforward: If some information arrives at some date τ , it is valued at that date by the conditional valuation, say V τ , and the original cash flow X = (X 1 , … X T ) is indifferent to the cash flow
. Then, the later cash flow can be discounted under the usual conditions.
The aim of this paper is to extend this result, as far as it can be done, to non-linear valuations.
Information
Taking into account future flexibilities and options in an investment or a project, amounts to integrate the value of the options into the project's present value. An option is exercised or not according to information arrivals of the type [Y=i] , where i∈I, here a finite set of information values, and Y is a measurable function on Ω. Indeed, when information [Y=i] obtains, the DM may anticipates it will modify its preferences over the project's payoffs and hence its valuation. For instance, its aversion to uncertainty (convex capacity) may be reduced or increased depending on the type of information ("good" or "bad" news). Or its preferences for present consumption may change if it learns it has more wealth available.
In the following we shall concentrate on the usual type of information, i.e. information at a given future date bearing on uncertain states.
Let us consider a filtration on 2
Information at date t = 1, … , T is given by an F t -measurable function Y t on S that defines a partition I t of F t with elements [Y t =i t ]. In order to lighten notations, let M(t) = # I t and, for
. We assume preferences and conditional preferences satisfy the following axiom proposed by Sarin and Wakker (1998) : . Then, if preferences are monotonic we could have a contradiction between unconditional and conditional valuations 7 . However we need not have one because all the i's are possible and the decision maker may still take into account payoffs for which X < X' and then not prefer X to X'. However if, for all i's,
, then, consistency with information arrivals would imply that:
This equivalence (under the condition:
) is the way Karni and Schmeidler (1991) 8 , for instance, expressed Dynamic Consistency (they did it in terms of preferences instead of values as we did and they limited information to a unique value).
We'll require a similar but weaker condition, as expressed for example by Nishimura and
Osaki (2003):
7 For instance, it would be the case if the decision maker's preferences satisfied consequentialism. 8 But see also : Sarin and Wakker (1998) , Machina (1998) and Ghirardato (2002) .
Axiom 5 (Dynamic Consistency):
Or, in terms of values:
In order to address the problem of consistently conditioning V, D and E when V = DE or V = ED, we need the following extension of Fubini's theorem.
Ghirardato-Fubini theorem
Let us recall that the DM has preferences on R Ω that are represented by a Choquet integral with respect to a capacity Ψ on 2
As Ω = S ! T, Ψ yields two marginal capacity measures, say: ν on 2 S and ρ on 2 T . In turn, these two capacity measures represent the DM's behaviour in front of uncertain statescontingent payoffs and of future dates contingent payoffs. These preferences over R S and R T satisfy the same axioms than preferences on R Ω , so they are represented again by Choquet integrals that define:
Mixing up the marginal measures and the value function representing preferences on R S and R T and introducing a hierarchy between the two components (that has to be justified), we can define:
X(s,t) dρ(t)] dν(s)
.
X(s,t) dν(s)] dρ (t) .
These value functions define two orders of preferences that have the same properties as the previous ones and can be represented by: ED(X) = ! " X dΨ 1 and DE(X) = ! " X dΨ 2 . In general, Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 and Ψ will not coincide except in some particular cases that we shall consider.
As we shall see, the hierarchy between preferences on time and on uncertain states can be justified by some hedging properties. When this is the case, it will be possible to show the coherence of the different preferences on Ω (and of the measures they define). Now let us recall some definitions introduced by Ghirardato (1997) :
Definition 2.3.1 (Slice comonotonicity):
-X!R S ! T is slice comonotonic, if all its t-sections and its s-sections are comonotonic. In contrast, the payoffs of project X' at time 1 show a variation that is compensated by the variations at time 2; X' 1 and X' 2 can hedge each other because they are not comonotonic:
Similarly, the DM can't expect that variations from one date to the other can be hedged by different uncertain trajectories in an S-comonotonic cash flow: X is comonotonic but X' is not -20, -9, 8) . Hence, these two cases (and the case where both sections are comonotonic) are relevant for particular investment problems where the DM is more concerned by date variations than by uncertain variations or the converse.
S-slice comonotonic because X'(s 2 ) = (-20, 10, -1) is not comonotonic with X'(s 3 ) = (
Mathematically, the impact of comonotonicity on linearity is easily understood with the following:
Lemma 2.3.1: For any T-slice comonotonic X such that ∀t∈T, X t ∈C k where C k is a comonotonic class, k∈{1, … , N!}, then capacity ν is represented by a probability measure µ k
For any S-slice comonotonic X such that ∀s∈S, X s ∈C h where C h is a comonotonic class, h∈{1, … , T!}, then ρ is represented by a probability measure π h and 
. Then, because we assumed all payoffs to be non negative, if X t is in the comonotonic class C k :
Furthermore, we know that a capacity ν on 2 S is additive on each comonotonic class so that:
Similarly, if X is S-slice comonotonic, we have:
QED
In order to use some of Ghirardato's (1997) If F is a comonotonic subset of Ω = S×T and ∀t ∈ T F t = {s∈S / 1 F (s, t)= 1}, ∀s ∈ S F s = {t∈T / 1 F (s, t) = 1}, then: Axiom 6 yields a result that was imposed as a mathematical condition in Ghirardato (1997) who dubbed it "the Fubini property".
Proposition 2.3.1: Under axiom 6, "the Fubini property" is satisfied:
, or:
F (s,t) dρ(t).
Proof: Notice that ! S 1 F (s,.) dν(s) is comonotonic with any of the 1 F (.,t), t∈T, then there exists an additive probability π h on T such that:
F (s,t) dπ h (t).
But ! T
F (.,t) dπ h (t)
is comonotonic with any of the 1 F (s,.), s∈S, hence there exists an additive probability µ k on S such that :
F (s,t) dπ h (t)]dµ k (s).
Fubini's theorem applies and
F (s,t) dµ k (s)]dπ h (t).
This yields the second equality of the lemma.
The first equality obtains because µ k and π h define a product probability, say Φ j on S×T, but Φ j is an additive representation of Ψ valid on the comonotonic class C j , j=1, …, (N×T)! (in R Ω ) to which 1 F belongs. As this is true for any comonotonic class, the Φ j 's define Ψ. 
QED
Furthermore, for any comonotonic class C k in R S containing all the comonotonic t-sections of X, there exists a probability distribution µ k defining an additive representation E k of preferences on C k such that for any X' with all its comonotonic t-sections in C k :
2-If X in R S×T is S-slice comonotonic, then: V(X) = D[E(X)].
Furthermore, for any comonotonic class C h containing all the comonotonic s-sections of X, there exists a probability distribution π h defining an additive representation D h of preferences on C h such that for any X' with all its comonotonic s-sections in C h :
V(X') = D h [E(X')].

3-If X in R S×T is slice comonotonic, then: V(X) = E[D(X)] = D[E(X)].
Interpretations: The first two results are lemma 3 of Ghirardato (1997) . The additive representation (valid on one comonotonic class only) is interpreted this way:
For the first one, consider a model consistent with Gilboa's (1989) idea in which time is measured by an non decreasing, non negative and bounded measure (a capacity in our special case). In this model, uncertainty has not been taken into account. Now, if we add it at each date, we obtain our model. However, because all the uncertain variables are comonotonic, comonotonic additivity applies and we only need to know the probability distribution that represents it on each comonotonic class. This can, but need be to be, extended to the whole space of uncertain variables, assuming then that de Finetti's coherence axiom applies.
The second formula is the usual discounted expected payoffs (here in the sense of a Choquet integral). Notice that discount factors (mathematically probabilities, here) depend on the comonotonic class in which there are no possibilities for hedging time variations.
The last result is the famous Ghirardato-Fubini theorem applied to our model. In all three cases, we obtain a representation of preferences in terms of some present value (constant equivalent), with the first integral additive.
In the next two sections, we shall use the Ghiraradato-Fubini theorem to address the problem of conditioning the present value expressed in terms of a Choquet integral and derive some results about conditional capacities.
Conditional valuation of S-slice comonotonic cash payoffs
In this section, we consider S-slice comonotonic cash payoffs X: S × T  R + , i.e. payoffs such that their time variations along trajectories all go the same way and hence can't be hedged. We assume X is a F-measurable process and we add a "present" for notational convenience as a date 0 that has no other role than defining an eventually non zero initial cash amount. Then, X can be defined as:
Let's introduce the usual notation for a Choquet integral:
{s N+1 } = ∅ for notational convenience. Then, we have:
, and π(0) = 1, we have:
Therefore, EC(X) is a certainty equivalent process of X.
From Model Consistency (axiom 4) we have the same type of value functions for a given information i τ at some date τ.
If we write:
, we have:
Dynamic consistency
In section 2, we introduced a weak definition of Dynamic Consistency (Axiom 5) that yields a link between unconditional and conditional valuations. We weaken it again thanks to:
Proposition 3.1.1: Axiom 5 (DC) implies:
Proof: ∀ τ = 1,…,T-1, define Z τ as follows:
Suppose w.l.o.g. that, for an information at date τ: " ) and for a date t = τ,…,T we have
With the following normalisation of conditional capacities:
It follows that:
Therefore, under axiom 5 (DC), we have:
, which implies:
Then:
This equality is satisfied for any X, and then it must be true at each date t:
We shall refer to (3.1) in the following as the dynamic consistency linking unconditional and conditional valuations.
Updating capacities
Relation (3.1) is a condition on the DM's preferences representation that yields an implicit definition of conditional Choquet expectation. We apply it to characteristic functions in order to derive updating rules for conditional capacities.
Proposition 3.2.1 9 : Under relation (3.1), for any i ∈ I τ , the conditional capacity of a set A ∈ F t , t > τ, is given by:
Proof: Relation (3.1):
The conditional capacity ν i (A) can be calculated in two cases only:
(i) When A ⊂ i, the "comonotonic" case (because 1 A and 1 i are comonotonic uncertain variables).
In this case, ν i (A) ≥ 0 and ν
and then
, which is Bayes formula.
(ii) When A C ⊂ i, the "antimonotonic" case (because 1 A and 1 i are anticomonotonic, i.e. 1 A and -1 i are comonotonic uncertain variables).
In this case, ν
, and then
, which is the Dempster-Shafer formula.
QED
The two rules we obtain result from the ranking of values after information obtains, and it depends on the type of information (comonotonic or antimonotonic with payoffs). The type of information can be interpreted as a "good" or "bad" news (with respect to what was expected). The fact that these rules integrate values that couldn't not obtain after information is in contradiction with consequentialism as we confirm below.
Consequentialism
Another familiar consistency condition known as consequentialism (Hammond (1989) ) is usually imposed as an axiom on preferences. It is well known however (see, for instance Sarin and Wakker (1998), Machina (1998) , Karni and Schmeidler (1991) , Ghirardato (2002) and Lapied and Toquebeuf (2007) ) that Model consistency, Dynamic consistency and Consequentialism imply additive (or quasi always additive) models. Ours is not, under the two first assumptions, hence it must be that Consequentialism is not satisfied, as we show below.
Definition 3.3.1 (Consequentialism in a dynamic setting): For these cash flows, Consequentialism, implies that
We have:
From Proposition 3.2.1:
-Because {s 3 } ⊂ i 2 its conditional capacity is given by Bayes updating rule:
-Because {s 1 ,s 2 ,s 3 } C = {s 4 } ⊂ i 2 its conditional capacity is given by Dempster-Schafer updating rule:
1# " (i 1 ) .
Let π 1 (2) = 0.9, and ν be a convex (non-additive) capacity with: ν({s 3 }) = 0.3, ν(i 1 ) = 0.5, ν(i 2 ) = 0.4, ν({s 1 ,s 2 ,s 3 }) = 0.9.
We obtain:
(X') = 10.575 , which is in contradiction with Consequentialism.
QED Proposition 3.3.2: V = DE does not collapse into discounted expected cash flows.
Proof: Consider the example used in proposition 3.3.1. We have: 1# " (i 2 ) .
Let us complete the definition of ν and set ν({s 1 }) = 0.3, ν({s 2 ,s 3 ,s 4 }) = 0.6, we obtain:
Relation (3.1) is trivially satisfied for τ = t = 1, we only have to consider the case where τ = 1 and t = 2:
Therefore, relation (3.1) is consistent with the (non-additive) capacity ν and with the conditional capacities defined by proposition 3.2.1. QED
The counter example used to prove the proposition uses the two the alternative two updating rules, other models based on dynamic consistency rely on one rule only.
Conditional valuation of T-slice comonotonic cash payoffs
In this section we concentrate on cash payoffs with all their t-sections in the same comonotonic class in R S , say C k , hence their uncertain variations can't be hedged. With the notation we introduced in section 2 for Choquet integrals (here on R T ) the valuation formula becomes:
Let us define:
∈ R S , with ρ(0) = 1.
Then: V[ET(X)] = V(X) and ET(X)
is an uncertain present equivalent of X.
Under Model Consistency, axiom 4, we have the same type of value functions conditional to a given information:
, where:
Let us note:
, with ρ τ (τ) = 1, we have:
Discounting must give zero weight to the payoffs before information obtains:
, where τ + = {τ,…,T}.
Dynamic consistency
As in the previous section, Dynamic Consistency (Axiom 5) yields a link between unconditional and conditional valuations.
Proposition 4.1.1: Axiom 5 (DC) implies :
where: τ -= {0,…,τ},
Proof: ∀ τ = 1,…,T-1, define:
For any s ∈ S, consider a permutation of the dates t = 0,…,τ -1 such that
This equality is satisfied for any X, and then it should be true for each state s:
"Upstating" capacities on Time
If updating means that we modify the measure of uncertainty according to information at some date, then we dubb "upstating" the fact that we modify the measure of time according to information (on the set of states) at the date at which it is obtained. Given that the DM's preferences satisfy axiom 5 (Dynamic Consistency) and hence relation (4.1) we have:
Proposition 4.2.1: Under relation (4.1), for F ⊂ T, with τ -= {0,…,τ}, and τ + = {τ,…,T}, the "upstated" discount factors are given by:
Proof:
We drop the reference to state s in relation (4.1) w.l.o.g:
For F ⊂ T and X = 1 F , we have:
We have to consider two cases:
These relations yield the "upstating" formulas under the equivalent conditions given in the proposition.
QED
In the more familiar case where F = {0,…,T} we have the following:
Corollary 4.2.1: Under relation (4.1), for F = {0,…,T}, the "upstated" discount factors are
given by:
As in the previous section, the different formulas come from the ranking of payoffs, but this time it's the payoffs before information obtains that make the difference.
The interpretations of these "upstating" formula are not straightforward. We can however propose the following: Given we deal with T-slice comonotonic payoffs, the important variations for the DM are the ones due to time. Hence, the timing of decisions is the most relevant feature for the valuation problem (and not the subsets of states that may be obtained after information). The weights given to the payoffs after information is obtained depend on the weights given in the past because these enter into the payoffs' ranking. As a result, aversion to time variations, say, may be modified depending on the relative importance of future vs past payoffs. The important point to note, is that the value of the past does count.
This is in contrast with the additive case where the usual compound discount factors formula would yield:
. We shall come back to this in section 4.3 where we'll see that this is what violates consequentialism in our model. Here, in contrast with the case of conditioning uncertainty, comonotonicity only plays a role in the ranking of values obtained before and after information is revealed at date τ.
Consequentialism
With the definition of Consequentialism (C) given in section 3, we have: The same result holds for τ = 1 and τ = 3.
Relation (4.1) is then consistent with a (non-additive) capacity ρ and with the conditional capacities defined by proposition 4.2.1.
QED
Conclusions
In our explicitly dynamic model, consistency of ex-ante and ex-post valuations plays a central role in the definition of conditional Choquet integrals and then of conditional capacities. We can derive updating and "upstating" capacities in the case where information is comonotonic (or antimonotonic) with payoffs. The role of comonotonicity is crucial in our model, it has an interpretation in terms of information: information comonotonic can be interpreted in terms of "good" or "bad" news (depending if future payoffs are greater or lower than past ones). More importantly, comonotonicity has a financial meaning: when two payoffs are comonotonic they can't hedge each other. This property is central to the Ghirardato-Fubini theorem that yields two hierarchies between preferences on uncertain payoffs and preferences on date contingent payoffs. In practice, comonotonicity is too strong a condition to satisfy and must be understood as a reference for applications to valuation problems where whether the timing or the uncertainty is the most relevant feature. We considered investments where time variations can't be hedged so that we can apply the criterion DE (discounted expectation) over future payoffs in section 3 and situations where uncertain variations can't be hedged so that we can use the criterion ED (expected discounting) in section 4. In both cases, the criterion is a double integral with the first one linear. As can be seen in the examples we referred to, there are cash flows where uncertainty is the primary concern of the DM, others where it's time that is more relevant. In a situation where the timing of decisions is crucial (for instance for a public project such as: when shall we launch a preventive campaign against an epidemics?) the DM may want to concentrate on the conditional discount factors. As we have seen in section 4, the payoffs before information arrives do influence the conditional discount factors:
for instance a lot of cash before information strikes may lower the discount factors used for later dates.
Conversely, in many investment problems, it's the uncertain variations of payoffs that are the main concern, for instance because the DM refers to market (additive) discount factors. Then, the DM needs to know the conditional measure on uncertain states in order to include option
